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Bail in Criminal Cases
ludge William K. Thomas*
BAIL IN CAPITAL CASES
"Dr. Samuel Sheppard requests this court to set bail," stated William
J. Corrigan, his defense attorney. It was Monday morning, August 16,
1954. Minutes before, this writer had continued for two days the pre-
liminary hearing of a first-degree murder charge against the accused.
The Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney (now Common Pleas Judge)
Saul S. Danaceau had moved for a continuance after announcing that
the Grand Jury on the same morning had launched an inquiry into the
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first-degree murder charge against the
murder of Marilyn Sheppard,
wife of Dr. Samuel Sheppard.
Serving as a common pleas
judge in the rare role of ex-
amining magistrate,' this writer
had been assigned to conduct
the preliminary hearing by the
acting Chief Justice Frank J.
Merrick of the Cuyahoga
County Common Pleas Court.
The assignment followed Judge
Merrick's disqualification of
the City of Bay Village coun-
cil president from conducting
a preliminary hearing on -the
accused. 2 Earlier, the court of
appeals had denied a writ of prohibition, which challenged the council
president's jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary hearings as acting
Mayor. The Mayor had voluntarily disqualified himself.
In his application for bail, counsel for the accused presented no evi-
dence but relied on the Ohio constitutional bail provision, article I,
*The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of persons without whose help this
article would not have been possible. Singled out for special thanks is Ruth Downey of the
court's secretarial staff who aided in many ways, particularly in the laborious task of collecting
the data sum'mrized in the part on BAIL IN AcrIoN. Also helpful in this survey were Hovard
Reid, Deputy Clerk in charge of the Criminal Court Clerk's office and his willirig associates:
Alice R. Doria, Florence Kirchner and Ruth Kneller of the Criminal Records Department,
and last but not least, his bailiff, Richard J. McDonnell.
1. pHio REv. CODE 5 2937.20.
2. State v. Sheppard, 121 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio C.P. 1954). Judge Merrick found that he had
"expressed himself on several occasions to the indication that he had a predisposition of
thought and opinion in the case .... Id. at 442.
3. State ex rel. Sheppard v. Barber, 100 Ohio App. 71, 121 N.E.2d 438 (1954).
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section 10. The prosecutor presented no evidence to support the charge
against the accused, but opposed Dr. Samuel Sheppard's application for
bail because the charge was first-degree murder.
Late that same morning the application for bail was granted. This
writer's bench opinion, dealing with the right to bail in capital cases,
is here repeated:
The accused has made application for bail. The question, of course,
that first arises is whether in a charge involving a capital offense an
accused is entitled to apply for bail. The Constitution of Ohio makes
it dear that he is entitled to apply.
It states that, "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except for capital offenses, where the proof is evident or the presump-
tion great. Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines
imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
That is part of the Bill-of-Rights of the Constitution of the State
of Ohio.
Now, then, the question that we must direct ourselves to in this
case is whether in this case the proof is evident and the presumption is
great of the commission by this accused of the offense of murder.
The courts of Ohio have had before them several times the problem
that I am dealing with, at least the general problem. For instance, the
question has come up: After a man charged with murder has been
indicted, may he ask for bail and may he be entitled to bail? The
Supreme Court of Ohio wrestled with that problem for a number of
years, and when they first decided it they held that he was not entitled
to ask for bail Then in 1933 the Supreme Court reversed earlier de-
cisions, and held that a Court of Common Pleas has the power to grant
bail, even after indictment.4  In other words, the indictment raises a
presumption, but not a conclusive presumption so as to meet the
requirements of the Constitution.
Our own Court of Appeals has put it very succinctly, with Judge
4. The 1933 Supreme Court decision referred to is State ex rel. Reams v. Stuart, 127 Ohio
St. 314, 188 N.E. 393 (1933). Its syllabus states:
"Under the provisions of Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution, and the statutes of Ohio,
the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction to hear and determine, before trial on the merits,
the application of a person, indicted for murder in the first degree, to be admitted to bail.
(State, ex rel. McClintock, Pros. Atty., v. Diehl, Judge, 115 Ohio St., 454, and proposition
two of the syllabus in Kendle v. Tarbell, Judge, 24 Ohio St., 196, overruled.)"
In the body of its opinion, the court comments on the following quotation from the Kendle
case:
"'The indictment raises the presumption required by the constitution to justify the refusal of
bail.'
In our opinion this is correct. The indictment creates no presumption against the defendant
upon the trial, but before the trial it raises a presumption sufficient to warrant his arrest,
and, in a proper case, to warrant his being held in custody until his guilt or innocence is
determined.
It does not follow, however, that this presumption, raised by the indictment, is so great that
it cannot be rebutted. Upon the hearing of an application for bail, the state may rest upon
this presumption; it need offer no evidence unless it chooses; and the accused may offer any
evidence he has in support of his application. It is then competent for the trial court to
determine whether the presumption has or has not been rebutted ......
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Hurd speaking, in In re Berman,5 when he said, "The capital offense
is one punishable by death. Where the proof is evident or the pre-
sumption is great, persons accused of such an offense are not entitled to
baiL"
So that the task that I have in front of me, here, is whether, on the
evidence, on the record before me, and only that, whether the proof is
evident, and the presumption is great. We, as I say, do not have even
the presumption of an indictment before us.
Therefore, it comes to the question of whether the proof is evident,
and again, our courts have made it dear, what is meant by that ex-
pression in our Constitution, in the Bill-of-Rights, "proof is evident."
In Ohio Jurisprudence,6 on page 13, it says as follows:
"In Ohio, if the evidence on the hearing of a petition for bail is
such that a verdict of guilty would be sustained as against a motion
for new trial, bail will be denied; or, as conversely stated, if the evidence
offered on the hearing of the petition for bail is of so weak a character
that it would not sustain a verdict of guilty as against a motion for a
new trial, the accused will be admitted to bail (Hampton v. The State,
42 Ohio St. 401)." As far as I can determine, that is still the law of
Ohio.
What is the evidence in front of me, here? Well, the answer is very
dear; there is no evidence in front of me, here. There is nothing,
except the application or a request for bail, and a statement by the
Prosecution that that request be denied.
This Court cannot indulge in any surmise or conjecture. I am
dealing with that point as a Judge, and as a principle of law. Is the
proof evident? And dearly, on the record before me, I must find that
there is nothing to sustain the claim before me, here.
I do not pass on any question of innocence or guilt in this matter;
I merely pass on the question of whether, in front of me here, there is
any evidence that would require me to deny bail. I find none.
Therefore, having in mind that this is an American court, still
carrying out American principles of law, still following our Constitution
and our Bill-of-Rights, the application for bail will be granted.
Bail was set at $50,000. The accused posted a surety bond and was
released. The next day, the Grand Jury indicted him for first-degree
murder. He was rearrested and reconfined. It was estimated that the
bond premium - for his 30 hours of freedom - ran not less than
$2500. A priceless possession, indeed, is personal freedom.
On August 18, 1954, this entry concluded the preliminary examina-
tion:
I -will therefore at this time, the grand jury having returned an in-
dictment of first degree murder against the accused, dismiss the pre-
liminary examination, and the bail which I granted, for the reasons I
granted it, in accordance with the laws of Ohio and the Constitution
and the Bill-of-Rights, is now cancelled.
The decision granting Dr. Sheppard's application for bail provoked
comments. One police officer was quoted as saying, "Law and order
5. In re Berman, 86 Ohio App. 411, 414, 87 NX.E.2d 716, 718 (1949).
6. 7 OHIO Ju1L 2d Bail & Recognizance § 9 (1954).
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is made only for the poor;"7 and another as saying, "Everyone arrested for
murder will probably now insist that he's entitled to bail."'  A signed
letter applauded the decision "as coming to grips with the constitutional
considerations." The same mail brought an anonymous postcard stating,
"Get off the bench, you don't belong there - Get a job sweeping streets."
A common pleas judge instructs the Grand Jury not to be influenced
either by public clamor or private malice. This is good advice for the
judge, too.
When arraigned on the first-degree murder indictment, Dr. Shep-
pard once more sought bail. The presiding judge denied his request.
On appeal from his conviction of second-degree murder, the denial of
bail after indictment was raised as his first claim of error. The Ohio
Court of Appeals (Eighth District) overruled this claim of error in these
words:
This was a question resting in the exercise of the sound discretion of the
trial court. The evidence produced at the hearing of defendant's re-
quest for bail has not been brought into the record before us. In any
event, such ruling cannot now be raised after trial and conviction.9
The Ohio Rule on the Right of an Accused to Bail
An affidavit charging first-degree murder, standing alone, is not
deemed to raise a presumption of guilt. Prior to a preliminary hearing,
at which the affidavit is supported by evidence, the accused is entitled
to bail. At a preliminary hearing, the evidence presented should de-
termine the right of the accused to bail. Evidence of guilt sufficient to
constitute probable cause and a bind-over to the grand jury would war-
rant a denial of bail. An accused's waiver of a preliminary hearing on a
first-degree murder charge also waives the right to bail.
After indictment, for the limited purpose of determining the right
to bail, a first-degree murder indictment "raises the presumption required
by the constitution to justify the refusal of bail."1 At a hearing on an
application for bail, evidence may be presented to rebut this presump-
tion. However, the burden is upon the accused seeking bail to show
that the proof of his guilt is not evident or the presumption thereof is
not great.
A ruling denying bail must rest in the judge's sound discretion." If
the evidence is such that a guilty verdict thereon would have been set
7. Cleveland News, August 17, 1954, p. 8, col. 4.
8. Cleveland Press, August 17, 1954, p. 1, col. 7.
9. State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 345, 354, 128 N.E.2d 471, 478 (1955).
10. See note 4 supra.
11. See note 9 supra.
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aside in a new trial, bail should be granted.1" Bail will be denied, even
after a. jury disagreement, if the evidence would have sustained a ver-
dict of guilty."3
The majority rule, corresponding to the Ohio rule, states:
In a proceeding to obtain bail brought by one indicted for a capital
offense, the burden is upon the defendant to show that the proof of
his guilt is not evident or that the presumption thereof is not great.14
Reversing the burden, the minority rule declares:
Notwithstanding the filing of an indictment or information against
the defendant charged with a capital offense . . . in proceedings to
obtain bail before judgment the state has the burden of showing that
the proof of the defendant's guilt is evident or the presumption thereof
great.' 5
Recently, in one of the minority jurisdictions, Texas, a widely pub-
licized bail hearing was held. The reported psychiatric testimony re-
lating to the accused, Jack Ruby, used in this hearing indicates the range
of evidence permitted at a Texas bail hearing in a capital case.
EXCESSIVE BAIL - A CASE STUDY
The judge who sets bail must be mindful of the Ohio constitutional
injunction (article I, section 9), "All persons shall be bailable by suf-
ficient sureties.. . .Excessive bail shall not be required" and the
Ohio Supreme Court's admonition, "Keeping an accused in jail by ex-
cessive bail is as much a denial of his constitutional rights as refusing
to fix bail."'" The same case holds that "the constitutional right to
non-excessive bail in bailable offenses may be fully protected by suing out
a writ of habeas corpus in a court of competent jurisdiction."
During the 1959 April term, this writer served as presiding judge
in Room One Criminal of the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County,
Ohio (Common Pleas general jurisdiction includes Civil, Criminal and
Domestic Relations). Room One Criminal hears all preliminary criminal
matters. During this term, the state moved to increase the bond of a
man bound over from the Cleveland Municipal Court. The charge was
malicious destruction of property of the value of $400 (a felony if the
value is $100 or more). A $10,000 bond was set, municipal court hav-
12. State v. Smith, 16 Ohio N.P.(n.s.) 385 (1914). But see State v. Lengel, 27 Ohio
N.P.(n.s.) 1 (1927).
13. See State v. Summons, 19 Ohio 139 (1850); Hampton v. State, 42 Ohio St. 401, 404(1884).
14. Annot, 89 A.L.R.2d 355, 362 (1963) (Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Flor-
ida, Indiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wyoming).
15. Id. at 358 (Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, and Texas).
16. State v. Bevacqua, 147 Ohio St. 20, 22, 67 N.E.2d 786, 788 (1946).
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ing previously set bond at $2,000. At the hearing, the accused was in-
formed that the question of the bond could be reopened at any time.
The next morning, July 23, 1959, upon request of defense counsel
Anthony Carlin and George Lavan, a bond hearing was held. Counsel
immediately questioned the jurisdiction of the common pleas court to
set a bond, contending:
This man has not been indicted and arraigned before this Court, and
we, first of all, question the jurisdiction of this Court to proceed without
an indictment.
The only method I know of of this Court proceeding on bond from the
Municipal Court of Cleveland lawfully would be if the Municipal Court
had set a bond that was in extreme, it would be necessary for the
defendant to then file a writ of habeas corpus before this Court, bring-
ing to this Court the attention of the unnecessarily high bond. This
Court would then have jurisdiction over the bond.
Until there is an arraignment we question the jurisdiction of this Court
over this defendant because there is nothing here before this Court.
When the Court assumes jurisdiction it would be either under a writ of
habeas corpus for excessive bond, or by indictment by the Grand Jury
of this county.
In overruling the jurisdiction challenge, this writer stated:
Actually, it [the bond question] has been raised normally by a defendant
who challenges the excessiveness of a bond not after filing a petition
of habeas corpus but coming into court and saying this matter is now
before the Court, there having been a bind-over and the papers having
been filed with the Clerk of Courts of Cuyahoga County.
In a number of cases we have considered the question and in several
cases we have reduced the bond and in several we have not. We have
assumed right along that the jurisdiction can't be in limbo. Surely
upon the bind-over the Municipal Court examining magistrate loses
jurisdiction, and therefore it would be in a state of no jurisdiction if
the theory you are advancing was followed ....
Authority for the ruling was based on "State v. Morrow17 . . . and also
the case of State ex rel. Macko v. Westropp." s
Richard H. Miller, assistant prosecuting attorney, thereupon moved:
At this time, your Honor, the State makes a request that the present
bond as sent over from the Municipal Court of Cleveland, being $2,000,
be increased to $10,000, based upon the facts and circumstances that the
State will show and explain to the Court, keeping in mind, your Honor,
17. The syllabus in State v. Morrow, 90 Ohio St. 202, 107 N.E. 515 (1914), reads:
"A case is pending in the common pleas court . . . when there is filed in that court a tran-
script of the criminal docket of the examining magistrate .... "
18. In State ex rel. Macko v. Westropp, 88 Ohio App. 104, 105, 93 N.E.2d 604, 605
(1950), Judge Skeel held: "Once a committing magistrate upon hearing, or waiver of such
hearing, commits the defendant to the consideration of the grand jury of the county and the
transcript of the case is filed with the Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas of the county, the
Court of Common Pleas is then vested with jurisdiction to hear all preliminary matters that
may thereafter arise, such as a motion to reduce the amount of the bail fixed by the com-
mitting magistrate."
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that bond or bail is not in the form of a penalty or a punishment but is
primarily a guarantee that a person accused of a crime will show up for
the time of trial.
He then read from the "Amount of Recognizance" section of the
Ohio Revised Code:
The amount of bond shall be fixed with consideration of the seriousness
of the offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant,
and the probability of his appearing at the trial of the cause.19
Evidence was taken. The following facts were revealed in the testi-
mony of the sole witness, Arthur Blythin, the Cleveland detective who
investigated the case. The accused did not take the stand.
The accused, driving an automobile with Michigan plates registered
to a woman said to be his mother-in-law, collided with the rear of a
stopped automobile. An argument ensued between the accused and the
driver of the other car. The latter went to a filling station to call the
police. Upon his return, the argument resumed. The accused knocked
the other driver to the pavement with his fist and started to choke him.
The other driver then cut the accused on the left arm with a pocket
knife.
The accused ran into a nearby gas station, picked up a 12-lb. sledge
hammer, chased the other driver down the street, and returned to the
driver's car. He hammered the car all over. He opened the hood and
hit the motor. Garage estimates of damage were $422.47 and $499.93.
Two women and one other man had been passengers in the car
driven by the accused. They disappeared and the accused refused to
identify them when requested. The accused refused to reveal any ad-
dress when arrested, and at no time would give an address. When asked
how long he had been in Cleveland, he stated that "he is a salesman
for surplus nuts and bolts and tires . . . and he was just in and out of
Cleveland." He said "he was in Cleveland at that time to see if he
could swing a business deal of some kind," but gave no place of business.
The detective was asked to read the FBI investigation record and
the Detroit police record of the accused. Objection was first made and
sustained for lack of identification of the record. Thereafter, the witness
testified that the fingerprints and the photo of the accused matched the
fingerprints and photo of the FBI and Detroit police records. Identifica-
tion of the records was found to be established.
Counsel for the accused objected to the reading of any entry other
than any felony conviction. Colloquy of counsel and the court's ques-
tioning will be repeated at length, as it involves the admissibility of dif-
ferent types of record entries at a bond hearing.
19. Omo R.v. CoDE § 2937.22.
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MR. CARLIN: If there is anything on this record - now, for in-
stance, I have a right to ask the man, before you permit him to testify
on this, if there were any arrests and convictions, felonies, either against
the State of Ohio, any state, or the United States. If they are on there,
yes; but if they are acquittals or dismissals, what right does the Court
have to go into that? It doesn't mean anything. That isn't a criminal
record. When a man is acquitted or dismissed, that is not a criminal
record. He has been vindicated as to his plea of not guilty.
THE COURT: Your position is the record before you would be
admissible only to the extent they are convictions shown for either a
State or Federal offense?
MR. CARLIN: That's right, your Honor. I would even object to
that, but I am willing to go along that far.
THE COURT [to the prosecution]: You are saying that any arrest,
even though it resulted in no conviction, is admissible here?
MR. MILLER: I think so, your Honor. For informational purposes.
We are showing you this to give you the informational background.
Your Honor has the wisdom to take the arrest - if there is no con-
viction, to disregard it. But I think the Court should be apprised of it.
This isn't going to prejudice the Court. But it is something you should
be apprised of, to know this man's background. The very same thing is
done in the Probation Department. They don't just look at convictions;
they go into the man's complete record. And the Court knows that
when he brings defendants before him he has questioned the man on
arrests without convictions to show the propensities of the man. And
we are showing the exact same thing, to show the propensities and the
amount of the arrests, just for informational sake; to show the propensi-
ties of this man, the wide variety and facility this man has, and the
number of states he has been in, and the number of crimes he has been
arrested for.
MR. CARLIN: Let me say this: The only thing that would be com-
petent here would be if he had jumped bond some place. If that is in
here, that is brought to the Court's attention. If he was accused of
murder and acquitted, that has no bearing on it. It is: Will he appear
here. And as I say, if it is said here that he had been a fugitive from
justice and had jumped a bond in California, then it is real pertinent
for the Court to know.
MR. MILLER: That might be in there.
MR. CARLIN: But if he was arrested for a parking ticket, or some-
thing else, that is certainly of no moment to the Court. It is either for
a felony or that he jumped bond some place and did not return for trial.
And there isn't anything like that in this record. If it was, I would
call it to the Court's attention; it would be my duty to make a complete
revelation to the Court.
THE COURT: Having in mind Section 2937.22, which says that
the Court shall consider the seriousness of the offense charged, the
previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his
appearing at the trial of the cause, it seems to me that I have a right
to consider every matter that relates to this man's past history. If a man
has been arrested, that doesn't go to the question of his habitual criminal
tendencies, if any; but it might very well go to the question of where
he has been, the fact that he is not listed in only one state but in more
than one state.
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It will be the ruling of the Court that the State can proceed to
question the witness with reference to the record before him.20
MR. CARLIN: The defendant takes exception.
The criminal record of the accused reflected that he had been con-
victed for disturbing the peace in Detroit.' Subsequently, between 1942
and 1955, he was held for investigation nine times in Detroit for various
offenses (some obviously felonies, others probably misdemeanors). Each
time,he charge was dismissed. On one such occasion he was turned
over 'to the United States Army, from which he was A.W.O.L.
In 195f, Detroit turned him over to Flint, Michigan. There, after
first being charged on suspicion of being a fugitive from justice, he plead
guilty to a felony, carrying concealed weapons. For this offense, he
served time in the Michigan State Prison at Jackson.
A Detroit Police Department radiogram to the Cleveland Police
Department reported that "accused left Travelers Motel, December 13,
1958, owing $213.35," adding "Unable to extradite. Not wanted here."
The accused was convicted of assault and battery in Dearborn, Michi-
gan.
Between 1942 and 1947 he was charged in Los Angeles - once
for statutory rape, and once for robbery.
He served two and a half months on a reduced charge of being an
adult contributor. Later he served eight additional months on the same
offense for failure to comply with the condition of his earlier release.
On one occasion, in El Paso, Texas in 1942, he was convicted of
vagrancy, and served out a $14 fine.
It was testified that the Cleveland Police Department had received a
warrant from Wheeling, West Virginia along with a letter to the effect
that the accused was wanted in Wheeling for unlawfully and feloniously
stealing $2,475. The detective also testified that, while the accused was
in custody, he was questioned by FBI men relative to a $35,000 stock
swindle in Wheeling, West Virginia. He related that "the defendant
told the FBI men that he knew certain members of the gang in that
stock swindle... he identified their pictures... and he finally told the
20. In retrospect, the criminal record was admissible for additional reasons. Most simply,
it was because Ohio Revised Code section 2937.22 uses the precise term "criminal record."
The term "criminal record" is construed to mean the official record kept by law enforcement
agencies as to a person's criminal offense charges and dispositions. Moreover, factors which
may be considered in fixing bail are not limited to the three named in Ohio Revised Code
section 2937.22. Ex parte Lonardo, 86 Ohio App. 289, 291, 89 N.E.2d 502 (1949), holds:
"in determining the amount of bail the following factors, among others, may be considered:
The nature of the offense, the penalty upon conviction thereof, the character and reputation
of the accused, and the probability of his appearance for trial." (Emphasis added.) Hence
the criminal record also was admissible as bearing on the accused's "character and reputation."
However, the juvenile portion of the accused's criminal record was excluded under "other
provisions of the law which say that a juvenile record is not permissible to be considered by
the court except in probation matters."
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FBI men he knew everything about that swindle but wasn't going to
tell anything."
After argument, bond was set at $7500, this writer stating:
We have here in front of us several pieces of evidence that cer-
tainly this Court cannot ignore; and perhaps the most compelling thing
I have heard in this hearing is the unrebutted and undisputed state-
ment that this man refused to give an address, that he said he was a
surplus nut and bolt salesman but gave no place of business, and,
therefore, when that is taken against the background presented here,
this man having been in a number of different states about the country
on various things that related to criminal proceedings, I think that
the bond must have to include in it a large element with reference to
the third factor that I must consider, namely, the probability of this
man appearing at the trial of the cause.
Taking that fact into full and complete consideration, at this time
the Court will fix a bond in the sum of $7500.
On August 5th, a habeas corpus petition, charging that the accused
was being unlawfully detained by reason of excessive and unreasonable
bond, was filed in the court of appeals. The petition was granted on
August 24, 1959, the journal entry reading:
The Court finds that the petitioner is illegally detained and im-
prisoned by said sheriff by reason of excessive and unreasonable bail,
to-wit:
Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7500.00) for the crime
of Malicious Destruction of Property in the alleged sum of approxi-
mately Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) as heretofore set by the
Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
It is hereby ordered that said bond be reduced to Twenty-five Hun-
dred Dollars.
In the opinion of this writer, the trial judge, it was necessary for the
bond to include "a large element with reference to the third factor ...
the probability of this man appearing at the trial of the cause." To the
court of appeals, presumably the controlling factor was the nature of the
offense - malicious destruction of property of the alleged value of
$400.
Subsequent events confirmed the court of appeals in its conclusion
that a $2500 bond was sufficient to secure the defendant's appearance.
On September 18th, 1959, he posted a $2500 surety bond. He was in-
dicted for malicious destruction and assault and battery on November
6th, 1959. Upon arraignment, November 12, 1959, he was released
on the same bond. On February 10th, 1960, he plead guilty before
Common Pleas Judge Joseph A. Ard to malicious destruction of prop-
erty, value being set at $450. He was referred to the Probation Depart-
ment which in turn referred him to the Psychiatric Clinic. The proba-
tion report, in addition to confirming the previously described police
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record, also reported his military record. During three years of military
service (1943 to 1946) he lost 407 days under Article of War No. 107.
It adds, "Such a record makes one wonder how he obtained an honorable
discharge." It stated that "his police record bears out his statement that
he has a bad temper. Nevertheless he appears to have superior intelli-
gence but is a rather irresponsible psychopath." Judge Artl refused
probation and sentenced him to the Ohio Penitentary on March 10,
1960.
An important bond lesson was learned from this case. An accused
may be transient and irresponsible. He may be totally lacking in com-
munity roots. He may have an extensive criminal record, principally
arrests. Yet, the outcome of this case demonstrates that a high bond
is not indispensable to deter disappearance and to secure appearance.
SETTING BAIL
Bail is not the first order of business at the arraignment. Instead,
the accused must initially be informed of his constitutional rights. Though
the remarks of presiding judges differ, the essence is the same. Speaking
collectively to those being arraigned, it is explained that a person ac-
cused of a crime, among his constitutional and legal rights, has the right
to be arraigned and to be informed of the nature of the crime charged.
All are told that presently each will be asked if he has read and under-
stands the indictment which has been returned against him by the Grand
Jury. The judge continues:
You have the constitutional right to have counsel represent you
in your case; and under our law if you are financially unable to hire
counsel the court will appoint an attorney to represent you.
Further, the judge informs the accused as follows:
, You will be asked whether your plea is guilty or not guilty. Should
you wish to be represented by counsel before pleading please inform the
court. If you do not request counsel it will be understood that you
do not wish to be represented by counsel
The presiding judge concludes with a discussion of guilty pleas,
probation, and dead time.
Should you fully understand the charge against you, and should you
actually be guilty of the charge then you may enter a plea of guilty.
Should you enter a plea of guilty, and if there is a basis for referring
you to the Probation Department, every possible consideration will be
given to referring you. Probation will largely depend on the Probation
Department's investigation and report.
Finally, you should know, if you have not already learned, that any
time spent in the county jail is dead time. Under Ohio law it cannot
be deducted from any penitentiary sentence received should you eventually
plead or be found guilty.
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Called individually before the bench, each accused hears the clerk
summarize the charge in the indictment (when the accused appears
with his counsel usually the reading of the indictment is waived). He
is then asked if he understands the indictment. An affirmative answer
leads the judge to put the question - How do you plead, guilty or not
guilty? When the plea is not guilty, the judge must set bail (certain
exceptions will later be considered).
In the criminal branch of the Cugahoga County Common Pleas
Court, the judge is furnished an information card concerning the accused
and the charge. Compiled by the court's Criminal Records Department,
the data helps the judge as he tries to quickly grasp the facts and to
size up the controlling bond factors. Prudent is the judge who pre-
digests the data cards before he commences the arraignments. This is
particularly true, when, as frequently occurs, he must arraign 10 to 25
or more accused at one session.
Relating to the "seriousness of the offense charged," the data card
reflects the criminal code sections, violations of which are charged by
the indictment, and the claimed facts of the :crime. charged are briefly
described. The data card lists any "previous crirmnifl record" of the ac-
cused, as transmitted from the prosecuting police' department.
The data card lists any address of the accused, the use of any aliases,
and any occupation. This information often suggests follow-up ques-
tions which the judge can put to the accused -in arl effort to discover
his family ties and the depth of his roots in the community.
When the accused has been bound over from an examining magis-
trate, a bind-over bond has been set. A legend persists that a presiding
judge, now deceased, exercising even-handed justice at arraignments,
doubled all bind-over bonds. Actually, the practice prevailing for some-
time in Room One Criminal is to continue the bind-over bond, unless
excessive or shockingly inadequate.
Where the accused has made the bind-over bond, his appearance at
the arraignment supports the adequacy of the bond. ,Moreover, if the
bind-over bond has been posted, an increase or decrease in the size of the
bond would require the execution of a new bond, and if it is a surety
bond the payment of a second premium. Nevertheless, the reasonableness
of the bind-over bond is reviewed at the arraignment. In most bind-
over cases, the same bond is continued, attesting,,to the reasonableness
of the amounts usually set by the examining magistrates.
BAIL IN ACTION
The record of bail for an entire term of court has been analyzed and
summarized. It is tle 1963 April Term of Roon'6& Criminal of the
Court of Common .Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Ohio ,(April 15, 1963
through September 3, 1963) during which term the' writer presided.
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During the term, 696 individuals were arraigned. Bonds were set
on 595 of those arraigned, and not set on 101. Of these 101, 66 plead
guilty at the ariaignment. Three were committed, after hearing, to
Lima State Hospital for the Insane until restored to reason.
The remaining 33, all who plead not guilty, were remanded to
the county jail. Seven, indicted for first-degree murder, were remanded
without bond, the indictment raising "the presumption required by the
Constitution to justify the refusal of bail."'" Three were transferred
from the Ohio Penitentiary to stand trial on new indictments. Eighteen,
on parole from a state penal institution, were held under Orders to Hold
served on the Sheriff by parole officers of the Ohio Pardon and Parole
Commission. Four were held under a holder issued to the Sheriff by
the Cuyahoga County Probation Department. The remand of parolees
and probationers without bond will now be explained.
Parolees, at any time before the expiration of the maximum period
of sentence and before final release by the Pardon and Parole Commis-
sion, may be declared parole violators and returned to prison.' Short
of its full exercise, this summary power may be used to order a parolee
held in county jail to await the outcome of the new indictment. Pend-
ing disposition of the new indictment, the holder of the parole officer is
honored by a remand of the parolee without bond.
Similarly, the Probation Department of the court is armed with the
power to arrest its probationer and to charge him as a probation viola-
tor.s Should the Probation Department or the probationer press for an
immediate inquiry into the conduct of the probationer, an inquiry would
be held to determine whether the probation should be terminated and
the original sentence, impoied,.24
Howeyer, thee is, rarely such a request until the new indictment has
been coAcluded " Apa'eI iitly, both probationers and the department
prefer, to avit the outcome ofj the new indictment. Should acquittal on
the new.1ndintment result, probation is likely to be continued. If the
new indictment results in conviction, the Probation Department is likely
to recommend that sentences on the old and the new convictions run
concurrently. Hence,' probationers, pending disposition of their new
indictments, aie remanded to county jail without bond.
Of th&, 18 ,remanded -parolees, 14 subsequently either plead guilty
or were fiond guilty. The casts of four were pending when this sur-
vey was completed in February 1964.
21. See note 4 supra.
22. See In re Varner, 166 Ohio St. 340, 142 N.E.2d 846 (1957); OHIo REV. CODE
5 2965.21 (Supp. 1963).
23. OHIO REV. CODE § 2951.08 (Supp, 1963).
24. See State v. Theisen, 167 Ohio St. U9, 146 N.E.2d 865 (1957); OHio REv. CODE §
2951.09 (Supp. 1963).
1964]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Three probationers have since plead guilty and have been sentenced
concurrently with their original convictions. The fourth probationer was
sentenced as a probation violator, the new indictment being nolled.
Returning to the 595 bonds which were set during the term, 439
of these persons succeeded in posting bonds and were released. Posted
were 367 surety bonds, 20 cash bonds, and 22 property bonds. Thirty
persons were released on their own recognizance.
Bonds made and bonds not made will first be analyzed and com-
pared by subdividing them vertically as to types, and horizontally as to
whether the bond set at arraignment continued, decreased, or increased
the bind-over bond set by the examining magistrate. Indictments (or
informations), originating in the Grand Jury without previous bind-
over, are recorded on a separate line. The results form Table One.
TABLE ONE
BONDS MADE BONDS TOTALS
Surety Cash Property Personal NOT MADE
Bind-over Bond
Continued 271 10 12 __ 92 385
Bind-over Bond
Reduced 17 2 4 2 21 46
Bind-over Bond
Increased 9 2 .. .. 21 32
Original
Indictments 70 6 6 28 22 132
Totals 367 20 22 30 156 595
Mention has been made of the practice prevailing in Room One
Criminal of continuing the bind-over bond on arraignment unless exces-
sive or shockingly inadequate. The above totals bear out this practice.
Subtraction of the 132 original indictments (or informations) leaves 463
indictments (or informations) following bind-overs. Of these 463, the
bind-over bond was continued in 385 instances. The bind-over bond was
reduced as to 46 persons and increased as to 32.
Return of 132 original indictments (or informations), represents
22% of the 595 persons on whom bonds were set. Thus, without
previous bind-overs from an examining magistrate, a substantial number
of criminal prosecutions were initiated by the 1963 April Term Grand
Jury (Malcolm Vilas, Foreman) and the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor,
John T. Corrigan.
Bonds made and bonds not made will now be compared by amounts,
as tabulated in Table Two. Reflecting the general criminal jurisdiction
of the court, fifty different types of felonies as well as a few misdemeanors
are involved in the indictments (or informations).
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Am6unt
Personal Bonds
$ 200.00
250.00
500.00
750.00
1000.00
1500.00
2000.00
2500.00
3000.00
3500.00
5000.00
7500.00
10000.00
15000.00
20000.00
25000.00
Totals
TABLE TWO
Bonds Made
30
3
1
69
1
168
45
31
52
7
4
24
1
1
2
When all bonds set (595) are listed by amounts, certain patterns
emerge. A widening gap between amounts fixed is noticeable as the
bond size increases. Though these bond figures were always in round
numbers, it is interesting to note that certain round numbers were never
used - for example, $4000, $6000, and $8000.
The ratios of bonds made to bonds not made at $500 (69 to 2), at
$1000 (168 to 12), and at $1500 (45 to 7) are striking. At these
levels, it is apparent that bonds are readily made, and failure to make
bonds of these amounts is exceptional. $2000 is the amount at which
difficulty in making bonds commences. Of the 439 bonds made, 317
(72%) were set at $1500 or less. In contrast, of the 156 bonds not
made, 135 (81%) were set at $2000 or more.
Even more to the point, 317 out of 338 (93%) made bonds of
$1500 or less; but at $2000 or higher, 135 of 257 (52%) failed to
make bond.
The thirty personal bonds represented 6% of the 439 bonds posted.
The types of crime in which personal bonds were authorized were relief
fraud (20), gambling violations (7), neglect of minor child (2), and
carrying concealed weapons (1).
As might be expected, analysis of bonds made and bonds not made
becomes more meaningful when the bond experience of a particular crime
is isolated and examined. Bond figures for six varied felonies have been
totaled and tabulated. Table Three, Armed Robbery, will be considered
first.
Armed Robbery
Significantly, the bonds made were $2500 or less, and the bonds not
Bonds Not Made
2
12
7
27
41
4
13
35
8
4
1
2
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TABLE THREE - ARMID ROBBERY
Amount Bonds Made Bonds Not Made
$ 500 1
1000 3
1500 3
2000 4
2500 6 3
3000 
__ 1
3500 
__ 1
5000 
__ 2
7500 
__ 4
25000 
__ 2
Totals 17 13
made were all $2500 or higher. At $2500, four made the bond and
three did not. Case by case examination reveals the higher bonds were
set on accused persons with repetitive records for convictions for similar
and serious offenses. The two $25,000 bonds were set on two young
men (ages 19 and 20) originally released on $2500 bonds on armed
robbery indictments. While out on bond, they jointly committed another
armed robbery (later pleading guilty to both offenses). Bonds on the
first indictments were immediately. raised from $2500 to $25,000.
The subsequent history of the thirteen men charged with armed rob-
bery who did not make bond has been traced. All cases have been ter-
minated. Eleven have plead guilty to armed or unarmed robbery and
one to aggravated assault (felony). The thirteenth was found not guilty
of armed robbery but guilty of the second count of cutting with intent
to wound.
Burglary
Table Four's title, Burglary, actually includes all types of burglary,
attempted burglary, and 'housebreaking. Many indictments include one
or more extra counts, grand larceny being most frequent.
TABLE FOUR - BURGLARY
Amount Bonds Made Bonds Not Made
$ 200 2
500 3
1000 15 3
1500 7
2000 8 9
2500 5 9
3000 1
3500 1
5000 6 15
7500 __ 1
10000 1 1
15000 2
20000 
-- 1
Totals 50 40
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At $2000, eight made bond and nine did not. At $1000, fifteen
made 'n dand three failed. lm~s~tk,,reverse is true at "$5000, .at
which IiMoun't six made the bond bu fifteen did not make bond. 'Even
at'$2500, nine failed to make boid; dbout' twice as many as the five
who made $2500 bond. Comparing burglary with armed robbery fig-
ures, it appears that those charged with burglary are less able to make
bonds of the same amount than those charged with armed robbery. No
one charged with armed robbery failed to make a bond less than $2500.
'But of those charged with burglary, -three did not make a $1000 bond,
andnine'did not make a $2000 bond,,
' "'Tie bonds of two who made $1500 bonds were raised to $10,000 on
August 30th, 1963, after hearing. It developed that in the early hours
of the ,morning they were found under circumstances which indicated a
breaking and entering was imminent when the police apprehended them.
One made bond, later breaking out of a suburban jail. The other failed
to make the $10,000 bond.
Since indictment, all of the 40 cases involving burglary or associated
offenses in which no bond was made have been terminated. Thirty-three
have plead guilty to burglary or an included felony. Two have plead
guilty to an included misdemeanor.. Threpehave been found guilty and
the remaining two indictments were noll6d or dismissed.
Felonious Assault
Felonious Assault, under Ohio law,,5 ,is a criminal act of a person
over .18 pn a child under 16. The assault-may be either willfully taking
"indeceni and improper liberties with thelperson of such child, without
committujaor intending to commitA,'crme of rape upon such child,"
or willfully making "improper exposures, of.his person in the presence of
such child." Table Five, Felonious Assault, deals with indictments charg-
ing felonious assault alone or along with related counts.
TABLE FIVE- FELONIOUS ASSAULT
Amount B'o ' nds Made Bonds Not Made
-$ 500 1
1000 3--
1500 3-
2000 1 1
2500 2
3000 1 1
3500 -- 1
5000 ." . ""'' ' 2
7500 1'2 ' .' -- 
10000 1 -- 
Totals 1I 7
25. OhIo REv. CODE S 2903.01 (Supp. 1963).
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Comparison of the bonds made with bonds not made in Table Five
indicates inability to make bond began at $2000. Once more it appears
that bonds of $500, $1000, or $1500 are usually posted. All of the
seven cases in which bond was not made have since been terminated.
Three plead guilty to felonies, two were found guilty of felonies, and two
plead guilty to misdemeanors.
The records of felonious assault cases in which bonds not made were
above $3500 have been reviewed. The following considerations were
material in fixing bond amounts. In the $10,000 bond case, the accused
was charged with five counts (incest, and four felonious assault counts)
on his 14-year old daughter. $2000 on each of five counts, one of which
was incest, was fixed.26
The accused on whom $7500 was set was charged with two counts
of felonious assault involving two girls under 12. He failed to appear at
his scheduled arraignment, then being free on a $5000 bind-over bond.
A capias was issued. He was picked up one and one-half months later.
Bond was then set at $7500.
The accused in one of the $5000 bond cases was charged with at-
tempted carnal knowledge and two counts of felonious assault on a step-
daughter. The other $5000 bond involved a charge of felonious assault
on a five-year old child by a defendant with a previous record of a re-
lated offense.
It has previously been noted that in fixing bail a trial court is not
limited to the factors named in Ohio Revised Code section 2937.22.
Thus, character and reputation of the accused, though not specifically
designated in the statute, 7 may be considered.28 The character and
reputation of the accused, and his criminal record, if any, because they
relate to one's propensity for criminal activity, bear on the probability of
his appearance for trial.
In charges of sex crimes upon minor children, upon release from
jail, the accused may return to the house or the neighborhood in which
the minor child lives. The judge in setting bail may and should con-
sider the propensity of the accused to thereafter commit sexual and other
criminal offenses against the alleged victims.
26. Cf. In re Cremati, 99 Ohio App. 402, 117 N.E.2d 440 (1954), in which the Court of
Appeals for Cuyahoga County ruled: "In consideration of these circumstances, the serious na-
ture of the offenses, and the penalties provided therefor, [one of the felonies carried a sentence
of life imprisonment] this court is of the opinion that bail fixed in the amount of $10,000
for each of the felonies here charged would not be excessive."
27. See note 19 supra.
28. See note 20 supra.
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Forgery
Forgery, the subject of Table Six, embraces the forgery of written in-
struments and/or uttering forged instruments. In practically all in-
stances, the instrument forged is a check. Four cases of uttering a check
with a knowing insufficiency of funds are also included.
TABLE SIX - FORGERY
Amount Bonds Made Bonds Not Made
$500 9 1
1000 13 2
1500 4 1
2000 3 3
2500 6
3000 1
3500 2
5000 2 3
7500
10000
15000
Totals 32 18
Those charged with forgery (or associated offenses) were able to
make a $500, $1000, or $1500 bond. Above $2000, it becomes dif-
ficult for most in this class to raise a bond. All 18 cases in which bonds
were not posted have been terminated. Sixteen plead guilty, and two
were found guilty.
Narcotics
Table Seven, Narcotics, deals principally with indictments charging
illegal possession of narcotic drugs.29 Included also are some indict-
ments with counts which charge possession for sale, sale of narcotic
drugs,30 and other offenses relating to narcotic drugs.
TABLE SEVEN - NARCOTICS
Amount Bonds Made Bonds Not Made
$ 500 2 __
1000 2
1500 1 1
2000 1
2500 13 3
3000 __
3500 2
5000 2
7500
Totals 21 6
29. Owlo REv. CODE 5 3719.09.
30. Oio REv. CODE § 3719.20.
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Sixteen of the 27 bonds set in narcotic cases were $2500, and 13
of these 16 bonds fixed at $2500 were posted. In contrast, the bonds
of $2500 set in all other crimes were made in 39 instances but not made
in the remaining 38. Most difficulty in making $2500 bonds occurred
in burglary cases, this size bond being made five times but not made in
nine instances. Persons charged with narcotics crimes, compared with
other crimes and particularly burglary, are finanicially better able to post
bonds."' The later course of the six charged with narcotics crimes who
did not make bond has been followed. Four plead guilty, one was found
not guilty, and one jumped bond with subsequent final bond forfeiture.
Five thousand dollars bond was set on the bond jumper. His indictment
charged him with possession, possession for sale, and sale of heroin. In-
dicted the same time for similar crimes, another man also has jumped
bond. His bond, also $5000, was set when arraigned at the previous
term of court.
Though the man this writer arraigned had no previous record, and
no request for a higher bond was made by the prosecutor, hindsight says
that this man, charged with heroin offenses, probably should have been
required to post a higher bond. Heroin cases are now rare. Current
narcotics cases principally involve marijuana.
Even if the bond had been set at $10,000 or more there of course is
no certainty that this man would not have jumped bond. There is no
foolproof system by which a judge may exercise his discretion to select
a bond large enough to absolutely insure appearance at trial, yet at an
amount sufficiently within financial reach to permit an accused to enjoy
his constitutional right to bail before trial. The fact is that the number
of disappearances, permanent enough to result in bond forfeitures against
the bondsmen, are relatively few. During 1963, (all terms of court)
there were ten, the breakdown of these cases appearing in a footnote.32
The Deputy Clerk of Courts estimates that 1100 to 1200 bonds
were in effect during 1963. Using that figure, the bond jumpers, with
31. A similar finding can be found in Ames, Rankin and Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Pro-
ject: An Interim Report on the Use of Pretrial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 67, 79 (1963).
"Those accused of narcotic crimes show greater ability to make bail than defendants facing
other high bail charges."
32. 1963 Permanent Bond Forfeitures
Case No. Crime Bond Amount
77142 Auto Stealing $1000
76855 Housebreaking 1000
77731 Forgery 1000
76617 Assault with a Deadly Weapon 3000
76721 Larceny by Trick 1500
75357 Shooting with Intent to Kill 5000
77450 Housebreaking 1000
77001 Relief Fraud 500
78186 Drug Law 5000
78187 Drug Law (Arraigned April Term, 1963) 5000
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final bond forfeiture, represent less than one per cent of those making
bond. This figure does not include capiases ordered, with or without
bond forfeiture, to produce accused persons who failed to appear when
directed. On issuance of a capias with a bond forfeiture, the burden is
on the bondsman to bring in the accused if he can be found. . When the
failure to appear is satisfactorily explained the bond is reinstated and
the capias is recalled. Otherwise, the accused is remanded to jail with
a higher bond being set.
Carrying Concealed Weapons
Carrying Concealed Weapons, which in Ohio may be punished either
as a misdemeanor or a felony, is the sixth and last crime on which bonds
have been tabulated.
TABLE EIGHT - CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS
Amount Bonds Made 'Bonds Not -Made
Personal 1 __
$ 250 1
500 33 1
1000 17 --
1500 2 1
2000 --
2500 -- 4
Totals 54 6
Table Eight reflects again that accused persons are generally able to
make bonds at $1500 and below, but that many are unable to post a
$2500 bond.
Now ended, the cases of the six persons charged with carrying con-
cealed weapons, but not making bond, resulted in five pleading guilty,
while the charge against the sixth was nolled and dismiss.ed.
Dispositions of Those Failing to Post Bail
The final table (Table Nine) totals the dispositions of the 156 per-
sons, on whom bail was set, but who failed to post bail. Atthe present,
143 (91%) have either plead guilty or been found guilty, while eight
(5 % ) have received acquittals or dismissals.
TABLE NINE
Plead guilty as charged, or to included felony-------------------- 113
Plead guilty to included misdemeanor -------------------------- 15
Found guilty as charged or of included offense------------------- 15
Found not guilty --------------------------------------------- 4
Nolled or dismissed ------------------------------------------- 4
Pending ---------------------------------------------------- 3
Committed to Lima State Hospital for Insane until restored to reason ---- 1
Not guilty by reason of insanity, committed to Lima State Hospital
until restored to reason ------------------------------------- 1
156
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PAST AND PROLOGUE
Confronting the Presiding Judge in Room One is the unrelenting
pressure of working to keep the county jail population within safe limits
and the criminal docket current. These circumstances, also relate to the
administration of bail. Excessive bonds, out of reach of the accused, not
only violate the constitutional right to reasonable bail, but would rapidly
and recklessly overcrowd the county jail. Additionally, when the criminal
docket fails behind and the trial of "bail cases" is delayed, protracted bail
freedom before trial may encourage some accused to disappear or to
commit crime. In its term report, the 1963 April Term Grand Jury
noted a relation between jail and bail:
Six months ago there were over 600 prisoners in the County Jail
A few days ago when the foreman of the Grand Jury checked there
were 359. 450 is the maximum number within proper security regula-
tions so that in that respect and in spite of the tremendous increase in
crime in recent years, the judges, prosecutor, and the sheriff are doing
a first class job. The only thing we wonder about in connection with
the greatly reduced population in the jail is whether some people are
out and in a position to commit more crimes who ought to be locked
up. Nothing can be done, however, to keep accused persons in jail
when they are charged with bailable offenses, so long as they meet the
required bail.
High bail is not a broad sword to wield against the possible commis-
sion of crime. Yet, when an accused out on bond, "in a position to com-
mit more crimes" to use the Grand Jury's phrase commits a felony, a
presiding judge, to protect the public, is warranted in raising his bond
substantially. The new bond should be commensurate with the now
demonstrated propensity for criminal activity. This accused by his own
conduct forfeits his right to bail within his financial reach. Three ac-
cused persons out on bond within the 1963 April Term are known to have
committed and were charged with new felonies. Two others were ap-
prehended under suspicious circumstances suggesting a felony was about
to be committed. Relatively speaking, however, bail is only infrequently
dishonored.
Nor should bail be set with the purpose of punishing the accused by
confinement in advance of trial on the assumption that the defendant is
probably guilty. "Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the
presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would
lose its meaning."33
Conversely, the eventual conviction or acquittal of the accused does
not prove or disprove the reasonableness of a bond which the accused was
unable to meet. The reasonableness of a bond is to be determined under
circumstances as they exist before trial, and one of these circumstances
33. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
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is the presumption of innocence which then attaches to the accused.
Therefore, neither the 143 pleas or findings of guilty, nor the eight ac-
quittals or dismissals so far recorded among the 156 not making bail
during the 1963 April Term, are relevant to the question of the reason-
ableness of the bonds set on these persons. Nevertheless, these figures
may serve to challenge any assumption that inability to make bail is
synonymous with innocence. But in fairly evaluating these figures, one
should consider a conclusion of the Manhattan Bail Project:
Pre-trial release has inherent value but there also appears to be basis
for belief that it has some effect on the ultimate disposition of a de-
fendant's case. Released defendants fare better than those who remain
in jail. Prior to trial, such a defendant is able to assist in the prepara-
tion of his own defense.34
As revealed in this survey, over-all bail figures from Cuyahoga County,
Ohio (Greater Cleveland) compare favorably with figures reported from
other cities. It has been shown that bail was set on 595 persons at ar-
raignment on indictment (or information). Of this total, 439 posted
bail, and 156 failed to post bail. Thus, 73% made bail. Columnist
Sylvia Porter reports, "In Baltimore and St. Louis 75 % of accused persons
can't raise bail at any figure. In Philadelphia 50% can't."' 5
This survey of Cuyahoga County bail figures, however, also shows
that here, as elsewhere in the United States, the financial ability of the
accused (and his dose kith and kin) to post the bond set actually decides
whether an accused can enjoy his constitutional right to bail. Computa-
tions from figures in Table Two disclose a startling contrast. Of the
338 bonds set at $1500 or less, 317 (93%) made them; but 135 (52%)
of 257 failed to make bonds set at $2000 or higher amounts. As the
size of the bond increases, the difficulty of raising the bond magnifies.
A presiding judge has frequent requests to reduce bond based on the
representation that the accused can make bail of a certain lesser amount.
In effect, the judge is being asked to consider the accused's financial abil-
ity to raise bail as a factor in fixing bond. Sometimes the request is
granted, and sometimes it is refused. But at all times it is implicitly un-
derstood and accepted that the judge has the power to consider this fac-
tor of financial ability as one of the factors material to fixing a reasonable
bond. As previously stated, the discretion of the court in fixing bond is
not narrowly limited to the three statutory factors of "seriousness of the
34. Arnes, Rankin and Sturz, supra note 31, at 90.
35. Percentages are quoted from the Sylvia Porter column, Reform of Antique Bail System
Looms, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 21, 1963, p. 51, cols. 1, 2. Columnist Porter charges:
"Hundreds of millions of dollars are wasted each year by communities across the country and
by the federal government on imprisonment of individuals simply because they're too poor
to raise bail." Similar percentages of persons not making bail are cited by Marquis Childs in
his column, Fight for Equal Justice Goes On, Cleveland Press, March 10, 1964, p. 11, col. 1.
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offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the
probability of his appearance at the trial of the case." 6
In considering an application to reduce bond, as in the initial fixing
of bond at the arraignment, the judge has the uneasy feeling that he is
being asked to make a determination without knowing as much as he
needs to know. What are the financial resources of the accused, or of
his family? Does he have a work record? How long has he lived in
the community? What are his family ties? Having seen that a pre-
sentence report is indispensable before determining whether a convicted
man should be granted probation, a judge fully realizes how blind he
flies under the present haphazard system of fixing bond.
There is a present need now to establish and operate a systematic pre-
arraignment bail investigation procedure as a joint central agency of com-
mon pleas and municipal courts. Of course, there would be problems in
administering such a system because of the short time ordinarily avail-
able in fixing bind-over, pre-arraignment, or arraignment bonds. Yet, a
questionnaire filled out by an accused (to be used only for purposes of
setting bail) with verifying phone calls by careful investigators should
secure bail information in time. Furthermore, a bond even if set would
be subject to change after the bond investigation is completed.
The value of the information now furnished the presiding judge by
the criminal records department indicates the added value of the more
complete investigation here proposed. With such a bail report, the judge
who sets bail may then in every case arrive at an informed judgment in
fixing a bail that reflects all important factors including the financial
ability of the accused to make bail. It is also significant that the same
investigation would acquaint the presiding judge with information essen-
tial to a fair determination of whether the accused is "unable to hire
counsel" and therefore entitled to assigned counsel compensated by the
county. Presently, the presiding judge must rely on his own inquiry at
the bench to determine the indigency of an accused and his right to as-
signed counsel.
Undoubtedly, such a pre-arraignment bail investigation procedure
would permit the use of personal recognizance (personal bonds) to be
extended both as to types of crimes and as to number approved. It is
highly persuasive that not one of the 30 granted personal bonds during
the 1963 April Term jumped bail. The current comment of Supreme
Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg in his article Equal Justice for the Poor,
Too is quite pertinent:
Recent studies in the area of bail have indicated that if carefully
screened defendants are released pending trial on their own recognizance
and treated with dignity, they will appear at trial.3 7
36. See note 20 supra.
37. N.Y. Times, March 15, 1964 (Magazine), p. 101, col. 1.
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Reference has been made to the Manhattan Bail Project. Still in
progress, this project, initiated in 1961, is being carried on by The Vera
Foundation, New York University School of Law, and The Institute of
Judicial Administration.
A report published in January 1963 gives the background of the
project:
The 1956 New York City Bail Study, conducted by law students from
the University of Pennsylvania, confirmed that New York's system suf-
fered from the same deficiencies as elsewhere. The courts were urged
to make increased use of parole, but it was recognized that they would
be reluctant to do so unless parole-jumping were made a crime and
unless means were provided for a thorough investigation of the de-
fendant's background before arraignment 8s
Release on personal recognizance is known in New York as pretrial
parole. Pretrial parole in criminal cases was authorized, effective Sep-
tember 1, 1962, by a law which provides that "in all cases in which bail
power is present, the court and the judges thereof may, in their discretion,
parole the defendant if reasonably satisfied that the defendant will appear
when wanted."39  A parole jumping law has been enacted also.4" The
Manhattan Bail Project has developed a pre-arraignment investigation
primarily of indigent accused.
Benefits of a pre-arraignment bail investigation procedure are detailed
in these findings of the first two years of the Project.
An investigation of the defendant's backround before arraignment is
practicable. The problems created by the pressure of time and the
exigencies of police and judicial procedure are not insuperable. Veri-
fication of information by telephone is sufficient for purposes of parole
recommendation in a significant number of cases.
The availability of background information enables judges to give
greater weight to factors other than the nature of the charge. When
the court has evidence that the defendant has lived in New York City
for fifteen years, has a family dependent upon him, has been employed
with some regularity, has no serious criminal record, and can make
bail only in a very small amount, it is possible to put the apparent
weight of the evidence and the possible penalty in proper perspective
and to make a balanced judgment. Clearly, a pre-arraignment investi-
gation is essential whether the objective is more careful bail-setting,
greater use of parole, or both.
The evidence gathered so far strongly indicates that parole can be
utilized with safety in a substantial number of cases . . . . Available
evidence at least suggests that the financial deterrent to flight has been
overrated and that other factors - ties to the community - are really
the effective deterrents. If this proves to be true, financial security
38. Ames, Rankin and Stutz, supra note 31, at 71.
39. N.Y.C. CamnwAL CT. Acr § 47.
40. N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1694-b.
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should obviously play a secondary role as a guarantee of the defendant's
return for trial.41
The Manhattan Bail Project is privately financed. The proposal here
made contemplates a pre-arraignment bail investigation procedure to be
established and operated as a joint agency of the common pleas court and
the municipal courts of the county. The frequency with which bind-over
bonds set in municipal courts are continued on arraignment suggests the
value of a joint court bail investigation procedure to correlate bond set-
ting between the county's municipal courts and common pleas court. A
successful joint agency precedent is the Psychiatric Clinic of the Common
Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio and the Municipal Court of Cleve-
land. The establishment of the pre-arraignment procedure would ap-
pear, without the necessity of new legislation, to be within existing judi-
cial power inherent in its administration of bail.
CONCLUSION
Based on the experience of the Manhattan Bail Project and previous
bail studies, certain new Ohio legislation appears advisable. Authority to
grant release on personal recognizance (without fixing any bond) is not
expressly granted at the present time. Therefore, a section similar to the
New York law permitting pretrial parole is recommended. Moreover,
parole and bail jumping, as in New York, probably should be made a
crime.
Long before Gideon v. Wainwright,42 Ohio's quest for equal justice
for all effectively provided that the right of an accused to the assistance
of counsel does not depend upon his financial ability to hire counsel.4"
Similarly, enjoyment of the right to bail in criminal cases should not be
denied an accused merely because he lacks the financial ability to post
bail. As well as all other relevant factors, an accused's financial ability
to make bail should be carefully weighed as the judge exercises his sound
discretion in setting bail.
41. Ames, Rankin and Stutz, supra note 31, at 91.
42. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), held that "the right of an indigent de-
fendant in a criminal trial to have the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right essential
to a fair trial."
43. OmIo REV. CODE §§ 2941.50-.51 (originally enacted in 1929), order the court of com-
mon pleas to assign counsel, with fees to be paid out of county funds, whenever an accused
charged with a felony is "without and unable to employ counsel."
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